



## Introduction

- ▶ Evidentiality: linguistic category that talks about information source
- ▶ Focus in the current literature (Faller 2002, 2007; Matthewson et al 2007; Matthewson 2012):
  - ▷ Relation between evidentiality and epistemic modality
  - ▷ Putative semantic heterogeneity of evidentials within and across languages
- ▶ (Korotkova 2016b):
  - ▷ Cross-linguistic variation in evidentiality is not unidimensional
  - ▷ No evidence for genuinely semantic cross-linguistic variation

## Agenda

### Central claims

- ▶ Evidentials exhibit uniformity across a range of environments
  - ▶ Not explained or addressed by previous approaches
  - ▶ Proposal: a unified account rooted in linguistic and non-linguistic subjectivity
- ▶ An orthogonal issue not affecting the main claim
- ▷ differences in veridicality/commitment between hearsay ( $\checkmark [Evp] \wedge [\neg p]$ ) vs. other types of information source ( $\# [Evp] \wedge [\neg p]$ ); see (Faller 2002; Murray 2014)

## Proposal: evidential subjectivity

- ▶ Non-linguistic subjectivity
  - ▷ Privileged and exclusive access to certain kinds of information about oneself: **feelings** (anger); **mental states** (having a thought); some (de Vignemont 2015) **bodily sensations** (pain, hunger)
  - ▷ Self-knowledge obtained via these channels is incorrigible
- ▶ Linguistic subjectivity
  - ▷ Expressions that describe privileged experiences: 1-person **attitude reports** (*I hope*), statements with **psych verbs** (*I am excited*) and about **pain** (*I have a splitting headache*)
  - ▷ Cognition constrains language: linguistic behavior depends on the processes described
  - ▷ Subjectivity only characterizes 1-person uses: the experiencer has the highest epistemic authority
- ▶ Evidential subjectivity (in contrast to the existing theories where having evidence is objective)
  - ▷ Evidentials describe subjective experiences: perception and introspection
  - ▷ Evidentials have a first-person component: part of their conventional meaning

### In a nutshell: evidentials as 1-person mental states

- (1)  $[[EV]]^{c,i,g} = \lambda p. p(i) \wedge \text{ACQUIRE}(p)(\text{Origo}_c, w_c)$ ,  
where ACQUIRE is a stand-in for predicates that specify how Origo learned  $p$
- ▶ Evidentials are sentential operators
  - ▶ Origo is a Kaplanian indexical
  - ▶  $c = i = \langle \text{author, hearer, origo, location, } \dots, \text{ world} \rangle$

## SUBJECTIVITY AT WORK I: non-challengeability in dialogues

### Evidentials ban direct denials in dialogues

- (2) Bulgarian
- A. Kalifornija legalizira-l-a marijuana-ta  
California legalize-IND.PST-F marijuana-DEF  
'C. legalized marijuana, I hear/infer.'
- B. That's not true.  
=  $\neg$  [California legalized]  
 $\neq$   $\neg$  [You heard/inferred it]
- ▶ Attested for all evidentials that have been studied within formal semantics

- ▶ Existing approaches (Izvorski 1997; Faller 2002; Matthewson et al. 2007; Murray 2014):
  - ▷ Premise: Not-At-Issue content (presuppositions, appositives, expressives ...) resists direct responses (Simons et al. 2010, Tonhauser 2012)—denials and otherwise (Jasinskaja 2016)
  - ▷ Claim: evidentials contribute NAI (presuppositional or otherwise)
  - ▷ Incorrect predictions (especially if evidentials are modelled like Pottsian supplements, as in (Murray 2014)): evidentials allow indirect denials and ban propositional anaphora
- ▶ My proposal (see (Korotkova 2016a) for more on subjective content and denials in discourse)
  - ▷ Premise: subjective expressions resist denials, direct and otherwise (NB: not faultless disagreement (Köbel 2003), where B talks about their own tastes/knowledge, not A's)
  - ▷ Claim: non-challengeability of evidentials is of the same nature
  - ▷ Correct predictions: evidentials ban all kinds of denials and allow propositional anaphora

|                                    | NAI                            | Subjective expressions | Evidentials |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|-------------|
| That's not true                    | ⊙/limited (Syrett & Koev 2015) | ⊙                      | ⊙           |
| Other types of denial              | ✓                              | ⊙                      | ⊙           |
| Non-denying propositional anaphora | ⊙                              | ✓                      | ✓           |

(3) Bulgarian: 1-person vs. 3-person hope reports

- A. Nadjava-m se [če Tramp šte spečeli].  
hope-1SG REFL [COMP Trump FUT win]  
'I hope that Trump will win.'
- A. Republikanci-te se nadjava-t [če Tramp šte spečeli].  
Republican.PL-DEF REFL hope-3PL [COMP Trump FUT win]  
'The Republicans hope that Trump will win.'
- B. #No, that's not true.  
B'. #You are mistaken.  
B'' #That's surprising.
- B. ✓No, that's not true.  
B'. ✓You are mistaken.  
B''. ✓That's surprising.

(4) Further reactions to evidential statements as in (2)

- B'. You are mistaken.  
=  $\neg$  [California legalized]  
 $\neq$   $\neg$  [You heard/inferred it]
- B''. That's surprising.  
= [That California legalized]  
= [That you heard/inferred it]

- ▶ Performance disagreement (term from (Anand 2009) on taste ascriptions): special cases that require pragmatic licensing such that the addressee considers the speaker insincere or incompetent
  - ✓ subjective expressions: e.g. *You are saying it only for provocation* in reply to (3)
  - ✓ evidentials: e.g. replies such as *What? You know it for a fact, you just forgot*
  - ▷ such replies challenge the premises for a speech act and thus differ from regular disagreement

## References

Anand, P. 2006. *De se*. PhD thesis. —2009. *Kinds of taste*. Ms. ◦ Bylinina, L. et al. 2014. The landscape of perspective-sensitivity. Talk at "Pronouns in embedded contexts at the syntax-semantics interface". ◦ Faller, M. 2002. *Semantics and pragmatics of evidentials in Cuzco Quechua*. PhD thesis. —2007. *Evidentiality above and below speech acts*. Ms. ◦ Garrett, E. 2001. *Evidentiality and Assertion in Tibetan*. PhD thesis. ◦ Harris, J. & C. Potts. 2009. Perspective-shifting with appositives and expressives. *L&P* 32. ◦ Izvorski, R. 1997. The present perfect as an epistemic modal. *SALT* 12. ◦ Jasinskaja, K. 2016. *Not at issue any more*. Ms. ◦ Koev, T. 2016. Evidentiality, learning events and spatiotemporal distance: The view from Bulgarian. *JoS* ◦ Köbel, M. 2003. Faultless disagreement. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian society* 104. ◦ Korotkova, N. 2015. Evidentials in attitudes: do's and don'ts. *Sub* 19. —2016a. Disagreement with evidentials: a call for subjectivity. *SemDial* 20. —2016b. *Heterogeneity and uniformity in the evidential domain*. PhD thesis. ◦ Kuno, S. 1973. *The structure of the Japanese language*. ◦ Lim, D. 2010. *Evidentials as interrogatives: a case study from Korean*. PhD thesis. ◦ Matthewson, L. 2012. Evidence about evidentials: Where fieldwork meets theory. *Empirical Approaches to Linguistic Theory: Studies in Meaning and Structure*. ◦ Matthewson, L. et al. 2007. Evidentials as epistemic modals: Evidence from St'át'imcets. *Linguistic Variation Yearbook* 7. ◦ McCready, E. 2007. Context shifting in questions and elsewhere. *Sub* 11. ◦ 2012. The indexical component of evidentiality. Talk at NASSLLI 5. —2014. Varieties of update. *S&P* 7. ◦ Pearson, H. 2015. Counterfactual De Se. Ms. ◦ San Roque, L. et al. In press. Evidentiality and interrogativity. *Lingua*. ◦ Sauerland, U. & M. Schenner. 2007. Embedded evidentials in Bulgarian. *Sub* 11. ◦ Schenner, M. 2010. Embedded evidentials in German. *Linguistic realization of evidentiality in European languages*. ◦ Şener, N. 2011. *Semantics and Pragmatics of Evidentials in Turkish*. PhD thesis. ◦ Simons, M. et al. 2010. What projects and why. *SALT* 20. ◦ Speas, M. & C. Tenny. 2003. Configurational properties of point of view roles. *Asymmetry in Grammar*. ◦ Syrett, C. & T. Koev. 2015. Experimental Evidence for the Truth Conditional Contribution and Shifting Information Status of Appositives. *JoS* 32. ◦ Tenny, C. 2006. Evidentiality, experiencers and the syntax of sentence in Japanese. *JEAL* 15. ◦ Tonhauser, J. 2012. Diagnosing (not-)at-issue content. *SULA* 6. ◦ de Vignemont, F. 2015. Bodily Awareness. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. ◦ Woods, R. 2014. The syntax of orientation shifting: Evidence from English high adverbs. *ConSOLE* 22.

## SUBJECTIVITY AT WORK II: first-person authority and awareness in attitude reports

### Evidentials ban third-party assessment in attitudes

- (5) Turkish
- Jay [ Anna bir köpek al-mış ] di-yor.  
Jay [ Anna INDEF puppy get-IND.PST ] say-PST  
'Jay said that Anna got-mış a puppy.'
- (i) ✓ *I was told that Anna got a dog. Jay visited her recently and has seen it himself.* ≈ 'Jay said that—and I've heard it—Anna got a puppy.'
- (ii) # *Jay visited Anna and found out that she finally got a dog. He's sure that Anna has told me—she wanted one for a long time. In fact, I haven't yet heard the news.* ≈ 'Jay said that, as he thinks I've heard, Anna got a puppy.'
- (iii) # *I visited Anna and found out that she finally got a dog. I'm sure that Anna has told Jay—she wanted one for a long time. In fact, she did call him, but he later forgot about it.* ≈ 'Jay said that—and he has heard it—Anna got a puppy.'
- (iv) ✓ *I visited Anna and saw her new dog. She also called Jay to share the news.* ≈ 'Jay said that, as he has heard, Anna got a puppy.'
- ▶ Also attested for Georgian; German; Japanese; Tagalog (own work with consultants)

### Existing approaches:

- ▷ Premise: little discussion of attitudes (except Sauerland & Schenner 2007; Schenner 2010; Şener 2011), conflation of *conceptually* distinct parameters: scope, perspective, projection
- ▷ Claim: speaker orientation = projection, attitude holder orientation = attitude verb scoping over the evidential (Faller 2002; Matthewson et al 2007; Matthewson 2012; Koev 2016)
- ▷ Incorrect prediction: without a formal representation for perspective, readings could exist such that the evidential ascribes evidence to a third party (cf. Harris & Potts 2009)
- ▶ My proposal (see (Korotkova 2015) for a mechanism of evidential shift)
  - ▷ Premise: interpretations in attitudes and in dialogues are subject to the same constraints
  - ▷ Claim: experiences described by evidentials ban third-party assessment, and the indexical component ensures that the evidence holder has the highest epistemic status
  - ▷ Correct prediction: evidentials can't ascribe evidence to a third party (perspective aside)

### Evidentials are banned in amnesiac scenarios

- (6) Turkish
- Context: Alexis and I are watching a muted video of a team of people in an escape room. After talking to a team member, one person suddenly rushes to a far left corner. Alexis thinks that that person was told that a clue is in that corner, and says so to me. What she doesn't realize is that this person is herself.
- #Alexis [ ipucu sol köşe-dey-miş ] de-di.  
Alexis [ clue left corner-LOC-IND.PST ] say1-PST  
Intended: 'Alexis said that she was told that the clue was in the left corner.'

- ▶ Awareness condition: evidential statements are made consciously about oneself
- ▶ Not derived by current approaches
- ▶ Hallmark of 'de se' expressions (mostly pronouns): treated as an arbitrary property of grammar that needs to be encoded in semantics (Chierchia 1989; Anand 2006; Pearson 2015)
- ▶ Awareness integral to subjectivity: inability to ascribe evidence to a third party implies inability to ascribe evidence to oneself as though to a third party

## SUBJECTIVITY AT WORK III: flip in information-seeking questions

### Evidentials shift to the addressee in questions

- (7) Bulgarian
- Mečka li e mina-l-a ottuk?  
bear q be.3SG.PRES pass-IND.PST-F from.here
- (i) # *Kit and I are hiking in the bear country and see fresh tracks. I talk to a ranger, but forget what I am told. (And Kit won't tell me his expert opinion).* ≈ 'Given what I heard, did a bear pass here?'
- (ii) ✓ *Kit and I are hiking in the bear country and see fresh tracks. Kit talks to a ranger (I can't hear them). I then ask:* ≈ 'Given what you heard, did a bear pass here?'
- ▶ Attested for all evidentials that have been studied within formal semantics
  - ▶ (San Roque at al in press): putative counter-examples; see (Korotkova 2016b) for discussion

- ▶ Previous accounts: shift is hard-wired to the syntax/semantics of evidentials
  - ▷ Indexical approaches (Lim 2010; Murray 2012)
    - ▷ Claim: evidential shift is a variety of indexical shift
    - ▷ Incorrect prediction: shiftable indexicals (*I* in e.g. Amharic; Schlenker 2003) may shift in questions
  - ▷ Universal approaches (Speas & Tenny 2003; McCready 2007; Bylinina et al. 2014; Woods 2014)
    - ▷ Premise: many point-of-view phenomena—e.g. experiencer predicates (Kuno 1973), expressions of spatial deixis or epistemics—are subject to interrogative flip (term from Tenny 2006)
    - ▷ Claim: point of view has a unified syntax/semantics
    - ▷ Incorrect prediction: all such phenomena are uniform across environments
- ▶ My proposal: the range of interpretations in questions is due to the combination of semantics for evidentials and pragmatics of questions (cf. Garrett's (2001) approach to shift)
  - Pragmatics of information-seeking questions
    - ▷ Information-seeking questions are about the addressee's opinion on some matter
    - ▷ Expressions dealing with point-of-view (broadly construed) should be able to shift
  - Evidentials could be speaker-oriented if:
    - ▷ ... the speaker doesn't know what their evidence is: in conflict with subjectivity
    - ▷ ... the speaker knows, or has a hunch regarding, the answer: in conflict with pragmatics
- ▶ Correct prediction: evidentials may be speaker-oriented in non-canonical questions, such as biased questions (ones that seek confirmation of some opinion) or quiz questions (the answer is known)

- (8) Bulgarian: quiz question
- To a linguist who has only learned Bulgarian phonotactics and will have to infer based on the form:
- koja ot tozi { e / \*e bi-l-a } duma v bălgarskija?  
which of this.PL { be.3SG.PRES / be.3SG.PRES be-IND.PST-F } word in Bulgarian  
'Which of these is a word in Bulgarian?' (NB: indirect impossible even though the addressee can't have direct evidence)

## Conclusion

- ▶ A unified account of a range of properties seen as unrelated in the previous literature
- ▶ The first link between the phenomenon of evidentiality and the nature of mental processes it describes